MG Rover at Longbridge went into administration ten years ago this week, with the loss of 6,300 jobs. More jobs were lost in supply chain firms, bringing the total number of jobs lost to just short of 10,000 jobs.
While a huge blow for all those affected, the loss of jobs and the impact of the closure was much less than was anticipated when the firm was first threatened with closure in 2000 at the time of its break-up and sale by BMW.
Closure then may have seen over 20,000 jobs go in the region.
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The five years between 2000 and 2005 were used by the regional development agency (RDA) Advantage West Midlands (AWM) and the first Rover Task Force to diversify the supply chain and the region's economy so that, by the time MG Rover did go under, far fewer jobs were lost.
"We looked over the edge and didn't like what we saw," said Alex Stephenson, the chairman of AWM a few years later.
That diversification effort probably saved 10,000 to 12,000 jobs.
You could hardly imagine today's local enterprise partnerships doing this sort of work and it shows the value of genuine regional-level capacity to anticipate and deal with shocks (the later regional task force used some of this experience to deal with the financial crash and aftermath from 2008 onwards).
Losing this "permanent capacity" and intelligence base with the scrapping of RDAs was a big mistake, I feel.
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MG Rover, of course, was the unprofitable rump of a former giant which for years had struggled to generate cash for new models, owing in part to a lack of integration across the firm.
It became reliant on Honda for new models in the 1980s before being acquired by BMW.
BMW's withdrawal from the firm in 2000 left MG Rover virtually dead on its feet and by 2002/03 it was clear to many the firm was running out of time and assets without a larger partner.
Also significant in the firm's demise, however, were a number of government industrial policy mistakes over the decades.
These included a misguided 'national champions' approach in the 1960s and 1970s, a failure to integrate activities under nationalisation, a mistaken privatisation to BAE and the failure of takeover policy in allowing the sale to what several saw as an "inappropriate" owner in BMW in the 1990s.
Add in the considerable volatility of sterling, and over-valuation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the scene was set for the firm's demise.
The firm ceased operations owing £1.3 billion to creditors, with over £100 million owed to 海角视频-based suppliers.
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MG-Rover's inability to pay its suppliers, and the resulting cashflow problems in the supply chain, cut off supplies into the factory and triggered the final collapse.
It also meant it was impossible for the administrator to restart production.
The firm's pension fund deficit ran to around £500 million, with the new Pension Protection Fund set up by the Labour Government (backed by private sector money) having to make up the difference.
On alert from the beginning of 2005, AWM and the national government moved quickly when MG Rover finally collapsed in April of that year.
A second Rover Task Force was set up with the aims of helping suppliers to keep going and to diversify, aiding workers in finding new jobs and in supporting the broader community.
An aid package eventually worth £176 million was made available, including £50 million for retraining, a £24 million loan fund to help otherwise viable businesses and £42 million to support suppliers to sustain trading.
Another £7.6 million was added by AWM in June 2005 to assist with supplier diversification. The support for suppliers proved critical in limiting the damage to the local economy.
For example, a £3.4 million Wage Replacement Scheme helped 170 firms and kept around 3,000 workers in place for the critical weeks following the collapse, with over 1,300 "confirmed" jobs being saved in this way.
Our research in tracking former MG Rover workers found that, three years on, the support put in place had helped many workers back into jobs but challenges remained.
Some 90 per cent of them had found new employment but two thirds had suffered wage falls. The median wage for the ex-Rover workers had fallen by over £5,600 per year in real terms.
Some two-thirds of ex-MG Rover workers had retrained by 2008/09. Just over 30 per cent of workers had stayed within the manufacturing sector.
They were earning broadly similar wages but the 60 per cent who had moved into the service sector were mostly earning less.
If anything, the collapse of MG Rover made it clear how valuable well-paid, good quality manufacturing jobs are for many people.
Then came the global financial crisis in 2008/09. Our follow up interviews with around 30 or so workers in 2009 found many who had found jobs had lost them again - a case of 'last in, first out'.
Indeed, many workers will have had numerous jobs since the collapse in 2005, indicating the much more precarious world of work into which they have found themselves.
Most recently, of course, there has been an upturn in the 海角视频 auto industry, with output rising by more than 50 per cent since 2009, led very much by Jaguar Land Rover based here in the West Midlands.
That automotive renaissance has been under-pinned by a big exchange rate depreciation back in 2009, large amounts of foreign investment, a shift to making premium cars, a supportive role from unions, and an industrial policy that values the auto sector (begun by Lord Mandelson late in the day for the last Labour government, and continued through today's Automotive Council).
Such rapid growth is leading to skills shortages as the industry - and especially the supply chain - struggles to find skilled staff.
Quite how many of the ex-MG Rover workers have gone back into the auto industry would be interesting to know.
There may well be scope for government-backed support for retraining to help ex-auto workers like those from MG Rover back into the industry given skill shortages.
Throughout the decade since the collapse, the Phoenix Four have unsurprisingly kept a low profile.
A damning 2009 report by the Department for Business found they had extracted some £42 million despite taking personal risks that were "relatively unsubstantial".
The Phoenix Four famously promised to set up a Trust Fund to help the ex-MG Rover workers. They still haven't delivered on that promise.
And ten years on, I'd still like to see some of the fine for Deloitte (which advised the Phoenix Four) going to compensate the workers and their families who lost out when MG Rover went bust.
And the Phoenix Four could still - ten years on - do the right thing and dip into their pockets to help the ex-MG Rover workers.
Professor David Bailey works at the Aston Business School, in Birmingham